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ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION ELIGIBILITY:
DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF COGNITIVE
DISABILITY
Tien-Kha Tran
Congress passed the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 in response to the extensive
history of discrimination Americans with disabilities have faced.
These federal statutes provide that no individual is to be precluded
from enjoying the programs provided by certain entities solely on
the basis of their disability. However, this is difficult in regards to
organ transplantation and individuals with cognitive disabilities.
The issue lies where a physician is faced with the difficult decision
in pursuing their moral and ethical obligations to preserve life while
determining whether a specific cognitive disability is a
contraindication for organ transplantation. This Note advocates for
federally implemented guidelines, supplementing current federal
antidiscrimination statutes, which would be more stringent on
healthcare providers and provide clarity to physicians to prevent
discrimination in determining whether an individual with a
cognitive disability should receive an organ transplant. This Note
provides the background of the applicable federal
antidiscrimination statutes and judicial interpretation of the
applicable statutes as well as the difficulties in procuring an organ
transplant and the risks subsequent to an organ transplant
procedure. Additionally, this Note discusses public policies and how
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some states have taken steps to deter discrimination. This Note will
also provide an analysis of physician discretion in evaluating organ
transplant eligibility and how absolute discretion presents the
opportunity for discrimination. Lastly, this Note provides solutions,
including judicial intervention and policy reform implementing a
spectrum of risk classification, and mandatory disclosure of the
reasons for transplantation refusal.
INTRODUCTION
The moment Maverick Higgs took his first breath on September
29, 2012, he was in dire need of a heart transplant.1 Maverick was
born with a heart condition called Hypoplastic Left Heart Syndrome
(“HLHS”), “a birth defect that affects normal blood flow through
the heart.”2 During the baby’s development in pregnancy, the left
side of the baby’s heart does not form properly.3 After two surgical
interventions, Maverick’s New York-Presbyterian medical team
determined that he required a heart transplant.4 At first the hospital’s
transplant program deemed Maverick “an eligible transplant
candidate.”5 Unfortunately, two days later, doctors diagnosed
Maverick with Coffin-Siris syndrome (“CSS”).6 CSS is a cognitive
disability and is also a rare genetic defect.7 Due to his diagnosis, the
doctors deemed Maverick ineligible for a new heart, informing his
parents that he would have “a high risk for tumors and
1

Elizabeth Cohen, Disabled Baby Denied Heart Transplant, CNN (Nov. 30,
2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/30/health/disabled-transplants.
2
Id.; Congenital Heart Defects (CHDs): Facts About Hypoplastic Left Heart
Syndrome, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (June 17, 2014),
http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/heartdefects/hlhs.html.
3
Id. When infants are born with HLHS, surgery conducted to treat HLHS is
done in three stages. Id. However, these surgeries do not cure the infant. Id. Infants
born with HLHS will require regular appointments with a cardiologist and lifelong medication. Id. Moreover, if surgery weakens the infant’s heart beyond
repair, a heart transplant may be needed. Id.
4
See Cohen, supra note 1.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
See Coffin Siris Syndrome, NAT’L ORG. FOR RARE DISORDERS,
https://rarediseases.org/rare-diseases/coffin-siris-syndrome/ (last visited Mar. 7,
2016).
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infections . . . . [Therefore,] a heart transplant would be too risky.”8
Maverick’s story illustrates a problem that is common for those with
cognitive disabilities seeking a life-saving organ transplant.
Determined to save her son, Maverick’s mother reviewed the
findings of various medical studies of CSS.9 The studies10 contained
no evidence that CSS patients had compromised immune systems.11
She sought and received confirmation by e-mailing her inquiries to
one of the researchers.12 Despite her findings, Maverick’s doctors
maintained that Maverick was ineligible for a transplant,13 insisting
that a transplant could put Maverick at a higher risk for tumors and
infections.14 Thereafter, Maverick’s father filed a complaint with the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, alleging the
hospital discriminated against Maverick “based on his disability,”
thereby denying him a potentially life-saving procedure.15
Maverick’s need for a heart and the doctors’ denial raises the
issue of whether precluding individuals with cognitive disabilities
from receiving organ transplantation is pure discrimination and
therefore a violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
8

Cohen, supra note 1.
Id.
10
Maverick’s medical team provided his parents with information on CSS,
which included a study by Dr. Gijs Santen. Id. Maverick’s mother subsequently
contacted Dr. Santen to confirm whether children diagnosed with CSS have
compromised immune systems. Id. Dr. Santen confirmed that children with CSS
have “no objective problem with the immune system.” Id.
11
Id. The medical team’s concern for Maverick being at an increased risk of
tumors and infections was due to their belief that children with CSS have
compromised immune systems. See id. In addition to a weak immune system, the
risk “would be greatly magnified combined with the immunosuppression
involved in transplantation.” Id.
12
Id.
13
Maverick’s parents were given contradicting reasons for denying him
access to the transplant waitlist. Id. On May 6, 2013, two of Maverick’s doctors
told his parents that “the doctors in Philadelphia had refused to give him a new
heart for the same reason: that his Coffin-Siris syndrome meant he had a
suppressed immune system.” Id. However, when Maverick’s mother inquired
further, the Philadelphia doctor told her “Maverick’s genetic problems played
very little role in their decision making.” Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
9
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and Title II of the American Disabilities Act of 1990.16 This Note
argues that federally funded organ transplant centers should
implement stricter guidelines to prevent discrimination in
determining whether an individual with a cognitive disability should
receive an organ transplant, with the inquiry focusing on the best
interest of the individual seeking transplantation. Furthermore,
doctors should only have discretion to prevent transplants in
situations where medical research confirms that a type of cognitive
disability actually entails a higher risk of transplantation failure.
This Note does not argue that discriminatory intent animates every
determination by a physician that a disabled person is not eligible
for an organ transplant. Rather, this Note argues that given the vast
discretion afforded to physicians and the potential for discriminatory
intent, increased oversight and heightened accountability are
necessary to ensure eligibility determinations are made based solely
on sound medical knowledge.
Part I of this Note discusses the background of the applicable
federal antidiscrimination statutes and judicial interpretation of the
applicable statutes. Part II discusses the difficulties in procuring an
organ transplant, how the National Organ Transplant Act addresses
the difficulties of organ procurement, the national waitlist for organ
transplantation, and the risks subsequent to an organ transplant
procedure. Part III of this Note discusses public policies—already
adopted in a few states—and how they lend themselves to the
solution proposed. Part IV of this Note will provide an analysis of
physician discretion in evaluating organ transplant eligibility and
how absolute discretion presents the opportunity for discrimination.
Lastly, Part V of this Note provides solutions, including judicial
intervention and policy reform implementing a spectrum of risk
16

See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12165 (2011).
According to the Autistic Self Advocacy Network (“ASAN”), “[p]eople with
disabilities may face discrimination when seeking potentially lifesaving organ
transplants. In such cases, discrimination often happens at the point where [an
individual] is referred for evaluation by a transplant center before [that individual
is] ever placed on the official transplant waiting list.” ASAN Joined by Coalition
Supporting MD Anti-Organ Transplant Discrimination Bill, ASAN: AUTISTIC
SELF
ADVOCACY
NETWORK
(Mar.
17,
2015),
http://autisticadvocacy.org/2015/03/asan-joined-by-coalition-supporting-mdanti-organ-transplant-discrimination-bill/ [hereinafter ASAN Antidiscrimination
Bill].
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classification, and mandatory disclosure of the reasons for
transplantation refusal.
I. BACKGROUND: FEDERAL STATUTES AND JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION
A. Applicable Federal Statutes
Federally funded and public entities fall within the requirements
of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Section 504”) and
Title II of the American Disabilities Act of 1990 (“Title II”). Both
statutes protect individuals from discrimination by healthcare
providers.17 Section 504 specifically applies to entities that receive
any amount or form of financial assistance from any of the federal
departments or agencies.18 This nondiscrimination statute protects
individuals from discrimination based on disability by prohibiting
these federally funded entities “from excluding or denying
individuals with disabilities an equal opportunity to receive program
benefits and services.”19 Section 504 protects “physical or mental
impairment[s] [which] substantially limit[] one or more major life
activities[;] . . . [an] example[] of impairment[] [includes] . . . mental
illness.”20
Title II protects the same types of “qualified individuals with
disabilities”21 but is distinguishable from Section 504 insofar as it
applies to all public entities, regardless of whether the entity

17

See Discrimination on the Basis of Disability, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/civilrights/understanding/disability/ (last visited
Mar. 7, 2016).
18
Fact Sheet: Your Rights Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, U.S.
DEP’T
HEALTH
AND
HUM.
SERVS.,
http://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/civilrights/resources/factsheets/504.pd
f (last visited Mar. 7, 2016) [hereinafter Fact Sheet Section 504].
19
Id.
20
Id. (emphasis added).
21
See Fact Sheet: Your Rights Under the Americans with Disabilities Act,
U.S.
DEP’T
HEALTH
AND
HUM.
SERVS.,
http://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/civilrights/resources/factsheets/ada.pd
f (last visited Mar. 7, 2016) [hereinafter Fact Sheet ADA].
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receives federal funding.22 Title II defines “[a]n individual with a
disability [a]s a person who has a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits major life activities; has a record of such an
impairment; or is regarded as having such an impairment.”23 This
statute protects individuals from discrimination by public entities to
provide them with the services and programs that the entity
specializes in. For example, healthcare providers like hospitals
cannot refuse care or deny participation in an organ transplantation
program to an individual solely on the basis of their physical or
mental disability.24
Violations of either of these statutes, based upon compliance
reviews by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’
Office for Civil Rights (“OCR”), may result in consequences, such
as decreased funding or sanctions.25 In Maverick’s case, New YorkPresbyterian Hospital is subject to Section 504 because it is federally
funded.26 While New York-Presbyterian Hospital may be a private
entity, thus making Title II inapplicable, Section 504 has been
interpreted consistently with Title II.27

22

Disability Rights Section: Title II Highlights, U.S. DEP’T JUST.,
http://www.ada.gov/t2hlt95.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2016).
23
Fact Sheet ADA, supra note 21.
24
See id.
25
See Resolution Agreements, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/complianceenforcement/agreements/index.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2016) (noting that when
HHS has not been able to “reach a satisfactory resolution through the covered
entity’s demonstrated compliance or corrective action through other informal
means, . . . civil money penalties (CMPs) may be imposed for noncompliance
against a covered entity”).
26
Facts
and
Financials,
NEW
YORK-PRESBYTERIAN,
http://nyp.org/about/facts-statistics.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2016). The figures
provided on New York-Presbyterian Hospital’s website indicate the types of
funding it receives or types of payments that patients use for healthcare. See id.
The fact that the hospital receives funds from both Medicaid and Medicare
indicates that they receive some sort of federal assistance. See id.
27
See State and Local Governments (Title II), ADA.GOV,
http://www.ada.gov/ada_title_II.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2016); see also ADA
Regulation for Title II, U.S. DEP’T JUST., http://www.ada.gov/reg2.htm (last
visited Mar. 7, 2016) (“Because title II of the ADA essentially extends the
nondiscrimination mandate of section 504 to those State and local governments
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The decision as to whether the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act
governs a certain circumstance depends on the determination of
whether the ADA is limited to entities that receive federal funding.
In Coleman v. Zatechka, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Nebraska expanded the applicability of the ADA to all public
entities after the University of Nebraska denied a paralyzed student
a request to be assigned a roommate in campus housing.28 The
university never placed the student in the pool of students that were
to be randomly assigned to a roommate because of her disability
which required a personal attendant.29 The court found that “the
ADA is not limited to programs receiving federal funding, but rather
applies to all public entities,”30 indicating that no individual should
be discriminated on the basis of their disability while trying to
participate in programs provided by the entity.31 The court further
defined “[t]he term ‘public entity’ [to] include[] States and any
department, agency or other instrumentality of a State.”32 In
Coleman, the university’s policy to exclude disabled students from
the equal opportunity to participate in the roommate assignment
program was a violation of the protections afforded by the ADA.33
Similarly, in Armstrong v. Wilson,34 the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California found that the ADA expanded
Section 504 to include any public entity, rather than just public
entities receiving federal funding.35 In Kinney v. Yerusalim, the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania broadly
interpreted the terms and requirements of these statutes to protect a
wider variety of individuals with disabilities, rather than just
physical disabilities.36

that do not receive Federal financial assistance, this rule hews closely to the
provisions of existing section 504 regulations.”).
28
Coleman v. Zatechka, 824 F. Supp. 1360, 1366–67 (D. Neb. 1993).
29
Id. at 1362, 1366.
30
Id. at 1367.
31
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12165 (2012).
32
Coleman, 824 F. Supp. at 1367.
33
Id. at 1372–73.
34
Armstrong v. Wilson, 942 F. Supp. 1252 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
35
Id. at 1258–59.
36
See Kinney v. Yerusalim, 812 F. Supp. 547 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
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As courts have repeatedly found, federally funded and public
entities are bound by both Section 504 and Title II. These entities
are thus prohibited from refusing or denying participation in any
programs or providing healthcare to individuals with either physical
or mental disabilities on the sole basis of their disability.37 If the
entity employs any eligibility standards that result in discriminatory
effects, the standards may be subject to a compliance review
conducted by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.38
These entities must provide an environment that is least restrictive
in access to their programs and must provide for equal opportunity
and access for all individuals.39 The U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services investigates these entities to ensure that there is
proper access to the facility for individuals with physical disabilities,
or that the entity provides appropriate means for effective
communication for those who have hearing, speech, or sight
impediments.40 Based on the outcome of this review, the entity may
then be required to either eliminate or revise the standards used in
determining if an individual may or may not benefit from the service
or program.41
These federal statutes were ultimately designed to protect
individuals, including those with disabilities, from being excluded
from equal opportunity and access to health care. Of course, there
may be legitimate and reasonable factors, excluding or due to the
disability, to preclude the individual from participating in receiving
the benefits from the program. Organ transplantation is not a
guaranteed life-saving procedure; complications that impair the

37

See Discrimination on the Basis of Disability, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/civilrights/understanding/disability/ (last visited
Mar. 7, 2016).
38
See Civil Rights, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/civilrights/index.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2016);
Resolution Agreements, supra note 25.
39
Civil Rights Requirements – C. Civil Rights Laws Applicable to Persons
with Disabilities, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/civilrights/for-individuals/special-topics/needy-families/persons-withdisabilities/index.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2016).
40
Id.
41
See id.
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health of the recipient may arise after transplantation.42 Common
health risks, such as cancerous infections or organ rejection, and
other medical complications may follow the procedure.43
B. Federal Civil Rights Legislation Defined by the Courts
The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) prohibits, in
general, discrimination on the basis of disability.44 But the ADA
articulates its prohibition on discrimination on the basis of disability
broadly and does not specifically address organ transplantation.45 In
Olmstead v. L. C. the U.S. Supreme Court determined that Congress
intended for the ADA to resolve the social issue of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities.46 The Court addressed the
legislative history of the statutes and congressional intent behind the
statutes.47 The Court found that Title II specifically sought to
eradicate the historical discrimination that individuals with
disabilities faced when they tried to participate in programs or
activities provided by public entities.48 Furthermore, it found that
“Congress instructed the Attorney General to issue regulations
implementing provisions of Title II, including § 12132’s
discrimination proscription.”49 The Attorney General is required to
42
Transplant Problems That May Show Up Later, AM. CANCER SOC’Y,
http://www.cancer.org/treatment/treatmentsandsideeffects/treatmenttypes/bonem
arrowandperipheralbloodstemcelltransplant/stem-cell-transplant-long-termproblems-after-transplant (last visited Mar. 7, 2016).
43
See infra Section II.C.
44
See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012) (describing the purpose of the Act “to
provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards of addressing
discrimination against individuals with disabilities” due to historical evidence of
how people with physical and/or mental disabilities have been prevented from
enjoying the right “to fully participate in all aspects of society” and that they have
been often unable to afford any “legal recourse to redress such discrimination”).
45
See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
disability, but does not discuss healthcare in regards to organ transplantation).
46
Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 588–89 (1999).
47
See id. at 588–92 (discussing the introductory provisions of the ADA and
the pervasive societal problem of segregating individuals with disabilities which
the statute sought to eliminate).
48
Id. at 589–90.
49
Id. at 591; see 42 U.S.C. § 12134(a) (2012).
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incorporate regulations that would be applicable to entities receiving
federal financial assistance, such as Section 504.50 The Court
recognized that both Title II and Section 504 compel public entities
and federally funded entities to “administer programs and activities
in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified
handicapped persons.”51
In Olmstead, two women were diagnosed with different
cognitive disabilities and were voluntarily admitted to Georgia
Regional Hospital where they were evaluated by a team of
physicians at different times.52 After their psychiatric conditions had
stabilized, their treating physicians concluded that they could be
treated in a community-based setting.53 Despite these evaluations,
both women remained involuntarily institutionalized in a segregated
environment.54 The women filed suit contending that the State
discriminated by reason of their disabilities.55 The Supreme Court
affirmed the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that “upheld the Attorney
General’s construction of the ADA” which concluded that the
actions of the State “constitute[d] a form of discrimination based on
disability prohibited by Title II.”56 Therefore, the Supreme Court
has recognized that cognitive disabilities are disabilities that fall
within Title II and Section 504’s protections.
Some lower federal courts have similarly interpreted the term
“disability” in the federal statutes to include a broad array of
disabilities, including cognitive disabilities. For example, in Kinney
v. Yerusalim,57 the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s
interpretation when it was faced with the issue of implementing the
ADA in Philadelphia.58 The district court recognized that Congress

50

Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 591.
Id. at 591–92 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 41.51(d)).
52
Id. at 593.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
See id. at 593–94.
56
Id. at 596–97.
57
Kinney v. Yerusalim, 812 F. Supp. 547 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
58
Kinney v. Yerusalim, 9 F.3d 1067, 1075 (3d Cir. 1993); see Kinney, 812
F. Supp. at 548. The plaintiffs were disabled individuals who sought to compel
the city to install accessible areas to accommodate their disabilities on all streets
51
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had passed the ADA, specifically Title II, “to address the problem
of discrimination against persons with disabilities” from
participating or receiving the benefits of public services by a public
entity.59 The court further recognized that the ADA requirements
“directed the Department of Justice . . . to promulgate regulations
consistent with the anti-discrimination provisions of Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973” which prohibit discrimination that
precludes any individual that is handicapped to participate in
programs that receive federal funds.60 The court found that the
statute should be construed broadly due to the fact that the purpose
of the ADA was to “eliminate discrimination against the disabled in
all facets of society” and in order to effectuate this remedial statute’s
purposes.61 This may be an indication that the court intended to
protect those who are physically and/or mentally disabled in every
public and social aspect, essentially in the rights that every wellabled person enjoys.62

that had been resurfaced since the effective date of the ADA. Kinney, 812 F. Supp.
at 548.
59
Kinney, 812 F. Supp. at 548.
60
Id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012).
61
Kinney, 812 F. Supp. at 551. The court deferred to congressional intent for
the purpose of protecting those who have historically endured the hindrances of
discrimination. See id. at 548 (“The removal of architectural barriers to the
disabled . . . was a major concern of Congress in passing the ADA.”).
62
See id. at 548 (deferring to Congress for interpretation of Title II, 42
U.S.C. § 12131). Some have argued, such as Assemblyman Villaraigosa during a
senate committee hearing in California, that even though the ADA intends to
protect individuals with disabilities from such discrimination, court interpretation
is required on areas where it is silent. S. HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. COMM. AB
2861, 1995–1996 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/9596/bill/asm/ab_2851-2900/ab_2861_cfa_960523_113041_sen_comm.html.
Assemblyman Villaraigosa’s concern was in regards to the Sandra Jensen case in
California, where a woman with Down Syndrome was denied a heart-lung
transplant solely on the basis of her disability. Id. Sandra Jensen’s case brought to
light the issue of organ transplant eligibility discrimination on the basis of mental
disability. See Bruce Kappel, Lives Worth Saving: Organ Transplantation and
People
with
Disabilities,
MNDDC
(June
2004),
http://mn.gov/mnddc/news/newsitems/transplant.html. Sandra Jensen was the
first person with Down Syndrome to receive a heart-lung transplant. Id.
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II. THE ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION PROCESS AND DIFFICULTIES
A. The National Organ Transplant Act, Organ
Procurement, and Transplantation Network and United
Network for Organ Sharing
Organ transplantation is a potentially life-saving process.63
However, historically, there has been a critical scarcity in organ
donation.64 To address this issue and improve organ matching and
placement, Congress passed the National Organ Transplant Act
(“NOTA”) in 1984.65 The Act applies to all organ transplant centers,
including federally funded entities as well as private and non-profit
organizations that are under federal contract.66 NOTA “made it a
crime ‘for any person to knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise
transfer any human organ for valuable consideration for use in
human transplantation if the transfer affects interstate
commerce.’”67 Congress acknowledged that an organ market would
portray human body parts as commodities by distributing organs
across state borders.68 A larger market could coerce organ donors to
sell their organs.69
63

Organ
and
Tissue
Donation,
HEALTH
DIRECT,
http://www.healthdirect.gov.au/organ-and-tissue-donation (last visited Mar. 7,
CLINIC,
2016);
Treatment
and
Procedures,
CLEVELAND
https://my.clevelandclinic.org/health/treatments_and_procedures/hic_Organ_Do
nation_and_Transplantation (last visited Mar. 7, 2016). See generally
NORTHWEST,
http://www.lcnw.org/donation/how-does-theLIFECENTER
donation-process-work/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2016).
64
See Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network: History & NOTA,
HEALTH
&
HUM.
SERVS.,
U.S.
DEP’T
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/governance/about-the-optn/history-nota/
(last
visited Mar. 7, 2016) [hereinafter OPTN History]; see also Treatment and
Procedures, supra note 63.
65
OPTN History, supra note 64.
66
Id.; see also Fact Sheet Section 504, supra note 18.
67
Gwen Mayes, Buying and Selling Organs for Transplantation in the US:
National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 (NOTA) Bans Buying and Selling,
MEDSCAPE, http://wwww.medscape.org/viewarticle/465200_2 (last visited Mar.
7, 2016) (quoting National Organ Transplant Act § 301).
68
OPTN History, supra note 64; see National Organ Transplant Act, Pub. L.
No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339 (1984).
69
See Mayes, supra note 67.
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Additionally, NOTA established the Organ Procurement and
Transplantation Network (“OPTN”) so that an organ transplantation
system across the nation will maintain a national registry for
efficient organ matching and allocation.70 The Department of Health
and Human Services’ Health Resources and Services
Administration (“HRSA”)71 has indicated that the OPTN policies
require that organ transplant centers provide the inclusion and
exclusion criteria they use in the evaluation process for an individual
who seeks to become a transplant candidate.72 These criteria
generally describe the characteristics that the organ transplant center
will review and evaluate in order to decide whether a patient is an
acceptable candidate for transplant, or if the patient will not be
considered as a candidate to be placed on the waitlist.73
Frequently, an individual may be denied placement on the
waitlist because non-medical factors such as habits or daily lifestyle
may be detrimental to the lifespan of the individual or organ
received.74 Medical factors are also taken into consideration in order

70

OPTN History, supra note 64; see Organ Transplantation: The Process,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
HEALTH
&
HUM.
SERVS.,
http://www.organdonor.gov/about/transplantprocess.html (last visited Mar. 7,
2016).
71
“The OPTN is administered under contract to the [Department of Health
and Human Services] through its Health Resources and Services Administration’s
[(“HRSA”)] Division of Transplantation. The OPTN contract is currently held by
the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) which has been the contractor
since 1986.” Organ Transplantation: The Process, supra note 70.
72
See 42 C.F.R. § 121.6(c) (2015) (“Transplant programs shall establish
criteria for organ acceptance, and shall provide such criteria to the OPTN and the
OPOs with which they are affiliated.”).
73
See id. § 121.6–7.
74
See General Considerations in Assessment for Transplant Candidacy,
U.S.
DEP’T
HEALTH
&
HUM.
SERVS.,
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/resources/ethics/general-considerations-inassessment-for-transplant-candidacy/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2016). For an example
of selection criteria considered in an evaluation for transplantation, see Transplant
Center:
The
Evaluation
Process,
UC DAVIS HEALTH SYS.,
http://www.ucdmc.ucdavis.edu/transplant/learnabout/learn_eval_process.html
(last visited Mar. 7, 2016) (“Smokers may be declined until they are able to
quit . . . . Candidates must be motivated, have demonstrated compliance with
medical and dialysis regimens, . . . live in a stable environment capable of
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to decrease the risk of complications like cancerous infections and
organ or host rejection post-transplant.75
B. Organ Procurement: Difficulties of Procuring an
Organ Transplant – The Waitlist
In order for an individual to procure an organ transplant, they
must first receive a referral from their physician to be evaluated by
the transplant facility.76 Those seeking referrals typically do so
because the individual’s organ failure is near its end stage, and
transplantation is the only remaining treatment.77 Next, a transplant
team at the facility determines whether the individual is eligible to
be a candidate on the organ transplant waitlist.78 Ultimately, “[t]he
hospital’s transplant team—a panel of physicians and other
professionals involved in the transplant process—makes
the . . . decision as to whether an individual is a good candidate” to
be placed on the waitlist, or if the individual should be refused such
placement.79 The United Network for Organ Sharing (“UNOS”), the
sole OPTN contractor since 1986,80 manages the database of all
supporting compliance with the transplant regimen . . . and not be an active
substance abuser.”).
75
For information on medical complications post-transplantation, see
DEBATING
SCI.
ISSUES,
ORGAN
TRANSPLANTATION
http://www.debatingscienceissues.com/wpcontent/uploads/2013/01/ORGAN_TRANSPLANTATION_print-friendly.pdf
(last visited Mar. 7, 2016).
76
The National Waiting List, UNOS TRANSPLANT LIVING,
http://www.transplantliving.org/before-the-transplant/getting-on-the-list/thenational-waiting-list/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2016).
77
See Human Organ Transplantation, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
http://www.who.int/transplantation/organ/en/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2016).
78
The National Waiting List, supra note 76.
79
ARI NE’EMAN ET AL., ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION AND PEOPLE WITH I/DD:
A REVIEW OF RESEARCH, POLICY AND NEXT STEPS, AUTISTIC SELF ADVOCACY
NETWORK
5
(Mar.
2013),
http://autisticadvocacy.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/03/ASAN-Organ-Transplantation-PolicyBrief_3.18.13.pdf. Additionally, “[t]he rules that dictate the waiting list vary by
organ.” Understanding the Organ Transplant Waiting List, GIFT OF LIFE DONOR
PROGRAM, http://www.donors1.org/patient/waitinglist/#1 (last visited Mar. 7,
2016).
80
Organ Transplantation: The Process, supra note 70.

ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION ELIGIBILITY

645

patients that are waiting for an organ.81 The waiting time for an
organ match and procurement varies depending on the organ.82 The
matching process also depends on several factors such as the blood
type of the organ donor and the individual and the distance between
the individual and the hospital.83
The UNOS Ethics Committee recognizes that severely limited
availability of organs requires an efficient way to determine the
probability of extending an individual’s life after a transplant
operation.84 The Committee requires that a transplant facility’s
physicians maintain ethical and “moral obligations to extend life and
relieve suffering” and “recognize the limitations of transplantation
in meeting these ends.”85 After the evaluating physician deems an
individual eligible for an organ transplant, they place him or her on
the OPTN national waitlist.86
A spot on the national waitlist, however, does not guarantee a
transplant. Because of the scarcity of donated organs, those on the
list often die while waiting for a match.87 The American Transplant
Foundation estimates that over 121,000 people in the United States
are on the waitlist for an organ transplant.88 Of those people, more
than 6,500 people die a year waiting for an available organ.89 In
2012 alone, 321 people died waiting for a new heart and in 2013 the
waitlist contained 3,500 individuals. The waitlist continues to grow
as the number of available organs remains approximately the
81

Understanding the Organ Transplant Waiting List, supra note 79.
See id. (reporting that the average median wait time for a kidney is 5 years,
a liver is 11 months, a heart is 4 months, a lung is 4 months, a kidney is 1.5 years,
and a pancreas is 2 years).
83
Organ Matching Process, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
http://www.organdonor.gov/about/organmatching.html (last visited Mar. 7,
2016).
84
See General Considerations in Assessment for Transplant Candidacy,
supra note 74.
85
Id.
86
Organ Transplantation: The Process, supra note 70.
87
The Need is Real: Data, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
http://www.organdonor.gov/about/data.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2016).
88
Facts
and
Myths,
AM.
TRANSPLANT
FOUND.,
http://www.americantransplantfoundation.org/about-transplant/facts-and-myths/
(last visited Mar. 7, 2016).
89
Id.
82
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same.90 The scarcity of organs forces physicians to evaluate patients
closely and select those most likely to receive the longest and
highest quality of life from a new organ.91
C. Risks Subsequent to an Organ Transplantation
While organ transplantation is a “life-saving therapy for patients
with end-stage organ disease,”92 it also results in an increased health
risk to the organ recipient.93 Organ transplant recipients are at high
risk of developing cancer,94 as well as other medical complications
such as organ rejection and infections due to immunosuppressant
medications.95 Organ transplant recipients must take
immunosuppressant medications to reduce the risk of their bodies
rejecting the new organ.96 Studies have shown that immune
suppression is associated with an increased risk of some cancers.97
90

Cohen, supra note 1.
See Allison Tong et al., Rationing Scarce Organs for Transplantation:
Healthcare Provider Perspectives on Wait-Listing and Organ Allocation, 27
CLINICAL TRANSPLANTATION 60, 60 (2013) (stating that physicians have a duty
to determine “how to maximize the benefit of scarce organs while maintaining
equity of access to transplantation . . . . Achieving equity mean[s] all patients
should have an equal chance of transplant”).
92
NIH Study Finds Broad Spectrum of Cancer Risk for Organ Transplant
Recipients in U.S., NAT’L CANCER INST. (Nov. 1, 2011),
http://www.cancer.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2011/OrganTransplantCancerRisk [hereinafter NIH Study].
93
See Israel Penn, Cancers Complicating Organ Transplantation, 323 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1767, 1767 (1990).
94
Id.; NIH Study, supra note 92.
95
Potential Risks of Transplant Surgery, UC DAVIS TRANSPLANT CTR.,
http://www.ucdmc.ucdavis.edu/transplant/learnabout/learn_risks.html
(last
visited Mar. 7, 2016).
96
Possible Kidney Transplant Complications, EMORY HEALTHCARE,
http://www.emoryhealthcare.org/transplant-kidney/learn-about/possiblecomplications.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2016); see also Kidney Transplant
Rejection,
U.
MISS.
MED.
CTR.,
https://www.ummchealth.com/health_care_services/transplant/adult/kidney_tran
splant/current_transplant_recipients/kidney_rejection/kidney_rejection.aspx (last
visited Mar. 7, 2016).
97
Claire M. Vajdic & Marina T. van Leeuwen, Cancer Incidence and Risk
Factors After Solid Organ Transplantation, 125 INT’L J. CANCER 1747, 1747
91
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According to the National Institute of Health, these medications
create a cancer risk that “resembles that of people with HIV
infection.”98 The recipient’s body may also overcome the effects of
the medication and reject the new organ.99 An individual’s own
susceptibility to infection may also impact his or her risk of
complication.100
Certain genetic defects may also put individuals at a higher risk
for tumors and infections after organ transplantation.101 Studies have
shown that children with Down syndrome have an immune system
that “is intrinsically deficient from the very beginning.”102 Due to
the fact that children with Down syndrome have poor immune
systems, “[t]ransplant experts have expressed concern that posttransplant immunosuppressant medications might increase the risk
of mortality significantly more in post-transplant patients with
Down syndrome than in post-transplant patients generally.”103 Thus,
Down syndrome may increase the risk for development of cancer or
infection after organ transplantation.104

(2009); see Jacques Dantal & Jean-Paul Soulillou, Immunosuppressive Drugs and
the Risk of Cancer After Organ Transplantation, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1371,
1371 (2005) (“As compared with an age-matched healthy population or with
patients undergoing dialysis, organ-transplant recipients have an increased
incidence of cancer.”).
98
NIH Study, supra note 92.
99
See Possible Kidney Transplant Complications, supra note 96; see also
Organ Rejection After Renal Transplant, COLUMBIA U. MED. CTR.,
http://columbiasurgery.org/kidney-transplant/organ-rejection-after-renaltransplant (last visited Mar. 7, 2016); Kidney Transplant Rejection, supra note 96.
100
Jay A. Fishman, M.D., Infection in Solid-Organ Transplant Recipients,
357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2601, 2601 (2007).
101
See Intrinsic Defect of the Immune System in Children with Down
Syndrome:
A
Review,
J.
TRANSLATIONAL
IMMUNOLOGY,
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2759463/ (last visited Mar. 7,
2016); see also Cohen, supra note 1.
102
See Intrinsic Defect of the Immune System in Children with Down
Syndrome: A Review, supra note 101.
103
Marilee A. Martens et al., Organ Transplantation, Organ Donation and
Mental Retardation, 10 PEDIATRIC TRANSPLANTATION 658, 661 (2006).
104
Helen Leonard et al., Heart and Heart-Lung Transplantation in Down’s
Syndrome,
NCBI
(Mar.
25,
2000),
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1127180/ (“Well documented
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In certain situations, doctors have a legitimate reason to preclude
those with cognitive disabilities, such as Down syndrome, from
receiving an organ transplant. Due to the fact that there are medical
concerns linking Down syndrome and organ transplantation that
pose a higher risk to these individuals, it is in their best interest for
them to not receive organ transplants. Similarly, cognitive
disabilities that result in a weaker immune system would give
doctors reason to consider refusing the individual with the
opportunity of transplantation since health risks after transplantation
are directly caused by a weak immune system.105
As discussed above, Maverick’s doctors rejected his candidacy
for transplantation based on his CSS.106 The doctors stated that
Maverick’s “genetic defect is associated with increased infections
and tumors, which would be greatly magnified combined with
immunosuppression involved in transplantation,” and that “he does
not qualify to be a heart transplant candidate . . . . based on the
medical implications of his [CSS], which would limit his survival
and potential benefit from transplantation.”107 On the contrary, the
doctors provided information about CSS to Maverick’s parents that
cited to a study conducted by Dr. Gijs Santen.108 When Maverick’s
mother contacted Dr. Gijs Santen, a clinical geneticist,109 to inquire
about Maverick’s condition, Dr. Santen responded that children with
CSS do not have compromised immune systems.110 Dr. Santen
further reported to CNN that “[t]here is no objective problem with
the immune system (in children with [CSS])” and that “infection risk
[would not be] a reason not to perform a heart transplant.”111 Studies
immunological abnormalities in Down’s syndrome result in a high incidence of
infection, autoimmune disease, and malignancy.”).
105
See Fishman, supra note 100.
106
See Cohen, supra note 1.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Julie S., Baby Denied of Heart Transplant Because He Has Rare, Genetic
Disease,
HNGN
(Dec.
1,
2013),
http://www.hngn.com/articles/18479/20131201/baby-denied-of-heart-transplantbecause-he-has-rare-genetic-disease.htm.
110
Cohen, supra note 1.
111
Id.; James Nye, Parents’ Outrage as They Claim Doctors Denied Their
Baby Son a Life-Saving Heart Transplant Operation ‘Because He is Disabled’,
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have shown that individuals with CSS have symptoms such as
distinctive craniofacial and skeletal abnormalities, delays in weight
gain, frequent respiratory infections, and intellectual disabilities.112
However, as Dr. Santen stated, while CSS may affect several body
systems, there has been no finding that individuals with CSS have a
deficiency with their immune system.113 Studies have similarly
shown that transplant recipients with CSS do not have any increased
risk of developing cancer.114 These conflicting conclusions highlight
how stories like Maverick’s raise questions as to whether doctors
are given too much discretion as to who is eligible to receive organ
transplants.
III. THE AUTISTIC SELF ADVOCACY NETWORK’S POLICY BRIEF AND
STATE LEGISLATURES
Although legal bright-line rules are difficult to formulate in
regards to such a convoluted topic as organ procurement for
cognitively disabled patients, some advocacy organizations have
formulated policy outlines of legal guidelines that provide direction.
These policies provide a clearer set of guidelines for physicians who
face these issues.115 The Autistic Self Advocacy Network
(“ASAN”) is a non-profit organization that advocates for the rights
DAILY MAIL (Nov. 30, 2013), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article2516085/Parents-outrage-baby-son-denied-heart-transplant-disabled.html.
112
Coffin Siris Syndrome, supra note 7; Samantha A. Schrier et al., The
Coffin-Siris Syndrome: A Proposed Diagnostic Approach and Assessment of 15
Overlapping
Cases,
NCBI
(June
18,
2012),
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3402612/;
Coffin-Siris
Syndrome,
GENETICS
HOME
REFERENCE
(May
2013),
http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/condition/coffin-siris-syndrome.
113
Nye, supra note 111; see also Coffin Siris Syndrome, supra note 7;
Schrier et al., supra note 112; Coffin-Siris Syndrome, supra note 112.
114
See Cohen, supra note 1; see also Samantha Schrier Vergano et al.,
Coffin-Siris Syndrome, NCBI, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK131811/
(last updated May 12, 2016) (explaining that there is a “rarity of tumors in CSS”).
CNN conducted interviews with six experts on CSS, including Dr. Santen. Cohen,
supra note 1. The six experts, including one of the founders of the syndrome, Dr.
Grange Coffin, agreed that children with CSS do not have compromised immune
systems and that CSS is not “a valid reason to deny a patient a transplant.” Id.
115
See ASAN Antidiscrimination Bill, supra note 16.
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of persons with autism.116 In March 2015, ASAN collaborated with
some advocacy groups and community service groups in Maryland
to advocate for an anti-organ transplant discrimination bill.117 The
Senate Bill addressed the issue of how people with disabilities
encounter discrimination when they seek life-saving organ
transplantation.118 The legislation would ban disability-based
discrimination in organ transplantation.119
The bill’s solution is to clarify that healthcare providers are
prohibited from refusing or denying services, such as organ
transplantation, “solely on the basis of a qualified individual’s
disability.”120 It also requires that healthcare providers take into
consideration every support available to assist an individual with a
disability to manage proper care after the procedure, and “include
a . . . procedure [that would] ensure that people in [critical] need of
an organ transplant can obtain timely resolutions to their

116

About,
AUTISTIC
SELF
ADVOCACY
NETWORK,
http://autisticadvocacy.org/home/about-asan/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2016).
117
See ASAN Antidiscrimination Bill, supra note 16 (listing advocacy and
community service groups, including The Arc Maryland, Maryland Association
of Community Services, Maryland Developmental Disabilities Council,
Maryland Disability Law Center, People On The Go, Independence Now,
National Down Syndrome Society, and Maryland Down Syndrome Advocacy
Coalition).
118
Id.
119
See id.
According to the policy brief, ‘[l]egislation . . . should explicitly
include the following points: (a) a prohibition against
discriminating against people with disabilities that are not
medically relevant to the transplantation process; (b)
clarification that support services should be considered when
assessing the ability of a transplantation candidate to comply
with postoperative procedures, and (c) the scope of services and
health care interactions relevant to the law, including referrals,
evaluation and recommendation for access to the transplantation
list.’
Maryland Enacts Law Banning Disability-Based Discrimination in Organ
Transplantation,
NASDDDS
(Mar.
29,
2015),
http://www.nasddds.org/news/maryland-enacts-law-banning-disability-baseddiscrimination-in-organ-transp/ [hereinafter Maryland Enacts Law].
120
ASAN Antidiscrimination Bill, supra note 16.
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[discrimination] claims.”121 This solution provides doctors with
clarity so that they may fulfill their obligations and properly
determine an individual’s need for transplantation without engaging
in discriminatory behavior.
Prior to ASAN’s policy guidelines, some states adopted
legislation to provide protection for individuals with cognitive
disabilities from discrimination in organ transplantation.122
“California was the first state to provide statutory protection for
intellectually disabled individuals seeking organ transplants.”123 In
1995, Sandra Jensen, a thirty-four year old with Down syndrome,
sought a heart-lung transplant.124 Transplant centers denied Sandra
because physicians did not want to “risk wasting scarce organs on
someone who might not be able to follow the complicated regimen
of post-transplant drugs.”125 Many found this rejection
discriminatory and unacceptable, and, consequently, the hospitals
relented and gave Sandra the transplant that she needed.126 As a
result, to avoid further discrimination on the basis of intellectual
disability, California passed legislation prohibiting such
discrimination in organ transplantation.127 The California Statute,
§7151.35(a), provides that:
No hospital, physician and surgeon, procurement
organization, or other person shall determine the
ultimate recipient of an anatomical gift based upon a
potential recipient’s physical or mental disability,
121

Id.
See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7151.35 (2015).
123
Sara Frank, Eligibility Discrimination of the Intellectually Disabled in
Pediatric Organ Transplantation, 10 J. HEALTH & BIOMED. L. 101, 111 (2014);
ASAN Antidiscrimination Bill, supra note 16; Laura Whelan, Allocating Organs
to Those with Down Syndrome: Compliance as a Scapegoat, BIOETHICS PROJECT,
http://blogs.kentplace.org/bioethicsproject/2014/02/10/allocating-organssyndrome-compliance-scapegoat/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2016); see CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 7151.35 (2015).
124
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Ideas & Trends: The Unlisted; Live and Let Die
Over
Transplants,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
5,
1998),
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/04/05/weekinreview/ideas-trends-the-unlistedlive-and-let-die-over-transplants.html?src=pm.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
See Frank, supra note 123, at 111–13.
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except to the extent that the physical or mental
disability has been found by a physician and surgeon,
following a case-by-case evaluation of the potential
recipient, to be medically significant to the provision
of the anatomical gift.128
In ASAN’s policy brief, it recommended that “states should
follow California’s example and pass legislation explicitly
clarifying legal protections against discrimination for people with
disabilities seeking transplants.”129 The brief further articulated that
supplemental state laws that enacted clearer guidelines in their
legislation would remedy the vagueness and difficulty of enforcing
federal civil rights law in medical decision-making.130
Several years after the Sandra Jensen case, New Jersey passed
similar legislation that “prohibit[ed] discrimination of people with
developmental disabilities” and ensured that these individuals
would receive the necessary medical treatment their conditions may
require, such as organ transplants.131 This legislation was a response
to the public outcry over the case of Amelia Rivera, a little girl that
was denied a transplant due to her mental capacity.132 In 2012,
Amelia Rivera desperately needed a transplant and, in response, her
mother offered her own kidney.133 Initially, the hospital denied the
procedure because Amelia was “mentally retarded” and had “brain
damage,”134 but reversed their decision as soon as the community
responded. In support of the family,135 New Jersey’s state legislators
passed a law “to prohibit discrimination against people with
128

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7151.35(a) (2015).
NE’EMAN ET AL., supra note 79, at 7.
130
See id.
131
Tim Shriver, Amelia Rivera, Our Symbol of Justice, SPECIAL OLYMPICS
BLOG
(Aug.
21,
2012),
https://specialolympicsblog.wordpress.com/2012/08/21/amelia-rivera-oursymbol-of-justice/; see also ASAN Antidiscrimination Bill, supra note 16.
132
ASAN Antidiscrimination Bill, supra note 16.
133
Id.
134
Emily Leaman, Should CHOP Refuse Transplants for Mentally Retarded
Kids?, PHILA. MAGAZINE, (Jan. 16, 2012), http://www.phillymag.com/be-wellphilly/2012/01/16/chop-refuse-transplants-mentally-retarded-kids/;
ASAN
Antidiscrimination Bill, supra note 16.
135
ASAN Antidiscrimination Bill, supra note 16; NE’EMAN ET AL., supra note
79, at 4.
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disabilities in the context of organ transplantation.”136 The state
legislature, following California’s approach, found that cognitive
disabilities fall within the meaning of “disability” that is protected
by the ADA and took the extra step of protecting the intellectually
disabled through state legislation as well.137 New Jersey’s statute
provides that any individual seeking “an anatomical gift shall not be
deemed ineligible to receive an anatomical gift solely because of the
individual’s physical or mental disability, except to the extent that
the physical or mental disability” is deemed “medically significant”
by a physician.138
Maryland has also enacted legislation139 “to ensure [that] people
with disabilities have access to life saving transplants.”140
Furthermore, Maryland’s legislation adopted ASAN’s policy
brief,141 prohibiting disability-based discrimination in organ
transplantation.142 Unlike California and New Jersey, Maryland
accomplished this by working proactively towards the issue with the
assistance of ASAN and several other advocacy groups. According
to ASAN, major transplant centers, such as the University of
Maryland, “have removed language from their websites saying that
they would not perform transplants for anyone with a ‘severe’

136

NE’EMAN ET AL., supra note 79, at 5 (“The [New Jersey]
legislation . . . prohibits denying a person with a disability referral, evaluation and
recommendation for transplantation solely on the basis of a non-medically
significant disability and notes that individuals who have the necessary support
system to comply with post-transplant medical requirements should not have the
inability to independently comply with those requirements held against them
when being evaluated for transplantation consideration.”).
137
Frank, supra note 123, at 114–15.
138
N.J. STAT. § 26:6–86.2 (2015).
139
Maryland Enacts Law, supra note 119.
140
ASAN Antidiscrimination Bill, supra note 16.
141
Samantha Crane, We Wrote It – Now It’s The Law!, AUTISTIC SELF
ADVOCACY NETWORK (Apr. 28, 2015), http://autisticadvocacy.org/2015/04/wewrote-it-now-its-the-law/; Maryland Enacts Law, supra note 119.
142
As discussed above, California and New Jersey have adopted such antidiscrimination legislation in response to cases such as Sandra Jensen and Amelia
Riveria. On the contrary, Maryland adopted such legislation with the elaborate
efforts of ASAN. See Crane, supra note 141.
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developmental or psychiatric disability, regardless of medical
need.”143
Pennsylvania has also taken a step toward adopting legislation
to protect those with cognitive disabilities. In June 2014, State
Senator John Sabatina introduced a house bill called “Paul’s Law”
in attempts to put an end to “discrimination against people with
disabilities who are in need of organ transplants.”144 Senator
Sabatina recognized the disparities that individuals with intellectual
disabilities continue to encounter when seeking an organ
transplant.145 The bill was named after an autistic man named Paul
Corby, who had a heart condition requiring a transplant.146 Just like
Sandra and Amelia, Paul was denied the transplant due to his
cognitive disability.147 After a large movement on Paul’s behalf,
Senator Sabatina introduced the bill to allow programs to “deny
transplants to people with disabilities only if the disabilities [were]
‘medically significant to the procedure.’”148 The bill would bar
denial to individuals with disabilities merely because they are
unable to “comply with complex post-transplant medical regimens
as long as they have an adequate support system.”149

143

Crane, supra note 141.
Tony Romeo, Pa. Lawmaker Wants to Give Disabled Equal Access to
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(June
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2014),
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See NE’EMAN ET AL., supra note 79, at 4.
148
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2015)
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IV. ANALYSIS: PHYSICIAN DISCRETION AND DISCRIMINATORY
EFFECTS
A. The Discretion of the Physicians Evaluating the Patient
for Transplantation Eligibility and its Effects
The decision to allocate organs takes into account many
complicated and interrelated factors which vary from case to case.
If research and data demonstrate a correlation between the cognitive
disability and a heightened complication risk post-transplantation,
then patients should rely on the expertise and discretion of their
physicians. However, where the risk is not scientifically and
conclusively proven, the physician evaluating the individual should
not have absolute discretion to determine transplant eligibility. The
physician should disclose that the risks to the individual are
unknown, provide the patient with options, and permit the patient to
decide whether he should be placed on the waitlist.
The current system of organ allocation provides physicians with
too much discretion.150 Individuals who require organ
transplantation are first evaluated by a team of physicians to
determine their eligibility to be placed on the waitlist.151 To
determine an individual’s eligibility, physicians take into account
several psychosocial variables such as “use of illicit drugs, alcohol
abuse, mental retardation (IQ [fifty and less]), and documented
medical noncompliance.”152 In denying an individual an organ
transplant for medical reasons, physicians rely on historical data and
research to determine if the transplantation coupled with the type of
cognitive disability will increase infection after the procedure.153
Because of a lack of federal legislation and hospital guidelines,
physicians must utilize their expertise in making eligibility

150
Approval from the team of transplant physicians is crucial in the organ
allocation process. See generally NE’EMAN ET AL., supra note 79, at 4–5.
151
See supra Section II.A; see also Frank, supra note 123, at 115–16
(discussing the role of transplant physicians, transplant teams and hospitals
deciding “who is listed for transplant and when they are listed”).
152
Charles E. Canter et al., AHA Scientific Statement: Indications for Heart
Transplantation in Pediatric Heart Disease, 115 CIRCULATION 658, 668 (2007).
153
Id.
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determinations.154 While the state statutes properly rely on the
expertise of well-educated and well-trained physicians in their
evaluation process, the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of
disability is extremely vague.155 Section 504 and Title II do not
provide for actual protections for those with disabilities in the face
of discrimination.156 Furthermore, federal civil rights legislation
does not provide sufficient guidance in the medical field to
determine what constitutes “discrimination” in terms of organ
transplantation and cognitive disabilities.157 There is also no system
of checks and balances where physicians may be held
accountable.158 Physicians have the ability to claim that an
individual is ineligible for candidacy and that it would be in the
individual’s best interest to not acquire an organ transplant.
Hospitals, however, lack guidelines159 that define what would be
in the individual’s “best interest,” which ultimately leaves
physicians with too much discretion and a lack of guidance and
accountability.

154

Depending on the type of organ that is needed for transplantation,
different physicians with different expertise areas would tend to the patient. See
generally Departments and Centers: Transplant Center, MAYO CLINIC,
http://www.mayoclinic.org/departments-centers/transplant-center/expertiseinnovation-research/living-donor-transplantation (last visited Mar. 7, 2016); see
also Areas of Expertise, TRANSPLANTATION: UC SAN DIEGO HEALTH CTR.,
http://health.ucsd.edu/specialties/surgery/transplant/areasexpertise/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 7, 2016) (discussing UC San Diego
Health Center’s various organ transplantation specialty programs).
155
See supra Section I.B.
156
See supra Section I.A.
157
See Frank, supra note 123.
158
Section 504 and Title II exist to protect individuals with disabilities from
discrimination by healthcare providers. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 794; 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12131–12165 (2011). As discussed in Section II.C, other than a compliance
review conducted by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
physicians are not held accountable for their actions. Non-compliance may result
in sanctions; however, these compliance reviews are generally only implemented
once someone has filed a valid and credible complaint to the agency. See supra
Section II.C.
159
See supra Section II.C.
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B. Discrimination
As New Jersey’s Senate President Steve Sweeney stated,
“[p]eople with developmental disabilities should not be treated as
second-class citizens . . . . They should be afforded the same rights
as anyone would want when entering a hospital.”160 There may be
medically viable reasons for denying individuals candidacy for an
organ transplant.161 However, categorizing all individuals with
cognitive disabilities as “high-risk” for infections or medical
complications raises the potential for discrimination. Since federally
funded and public entities are required to abide by federal civil rights
laws, these entities should be working to comply with these
regulations.162 Of course, physicians may deny organs to some
individuals due to the fact that they may partake in habits such as
excessive alcohol consumption or smoking.163 However, some
transplant centers will continue to consider these individuals by
requiring them to undergo certain programs to prove that they have
reformed with a new lifestyle, and be reconsidered for candidacy.164
Those who are born with cognitive disabilities do not have this
option, and broadly denying them the ability to procure an organ
transplant denies them access to healthcare simply because of their
disability.165
160
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In any event, physicians have a moral and ethical obligation to
extend life to the best of their ability and, with regards to organ
transplantation, must recognize the scarcity of organs.166 Patients
with common forms of cognitive disabilities167 that do carry an
abnormally high-risk for medical complications after any transplant
procedure would be understandably denied for candidacy. However,
in cases where the patient’s form of cognitive disability is rare, as
was the case with Maverick, and there is conflicting research on
whether a transplant will increase risk of complications like organ
rejection, infection, or host rejection, there should be limits on the
doctor’s discretion.168 It is important that the federal government or
individual state governments implement new laws, similar to
California’s or New Jersey’s model, or federal agencies create
guidelines that ensure that doctors will make efficient and objective
decisions based on the best interests of the patient and not on a
subjective discretionary evaluation.
Healthcare providers, both federally funded and public entities,
are already bound by Section 504 and Title II and are prohibited
from discriminating on the basis of disability.169 However, these
statutes170 are insufficient to prevent such discrimination from
occurring. While these federal statutes may provide an explicit form
of protection for the intellectually disabled,171 there is a lack of
guidance for physicians who encounter these issues that call for their
discretion in making difficult decisions to place an individual on the
waitlist as a valid candidate for organ transplant.
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS: WHY A POLICY SIMILAR TO THE AUTISTIC
SELF-ADVOCACY NETWORK’S FRAMEWORK SHOULD BE
ADOPTED FEDERALLY
A. Judicial Intervention
As discussed in Section I.B, courts have deferred to Congress
for interpreting Title II and Section 504.172 In Olmstead, the
Supreme Court found that Congress intended for Title II and Section
504 to protect individuals with cognitive disabilities from
discrimination.173 However, the Court did not provide clear
guidelines as to what constitutes discrimination in regards to making
medical decisions in organ transplantation. Moving forward, courts
can address this issue by providing this type of guidance to
physicians making transplant eligibility decisions. In appropriate
instances courts should intervene and decide whether healthcare
providers are providing enough evidence to prove that they are
genuinely denying an individual with a cognitive disability for a
legitimate medical reason. Although the judiciary should defer to
the expertise of medical professionals, it should not do so at the
expense of the civil rights of the cognitively disabled.
On the contrary, court intervention may not be the best
alternative in addressing this issue due to the fact that any individual
diagnosed with a life-threatening illness that requires immediate
medical intervention would have to wait for an inconclusive amount
of time for their case to be heard in court.174 While civil rights law
may extend protection for people with disabilities, the difficulties of
enforcing such laws to provide access to life-saving procedures have
172
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hindered affected individuals.175 As ASAN stated in its policy brief,
“it has historically been difficult to enforce federal civil rights law
within the area of medical decision-making.”176 Many physicians
therefore “presume that, given the subjective nature of clinical
judgment regarding organ transplantation decisions, disability civil
rights laws may not be relevant or applicable.”177 For this reason,
individuals and families may not be able to bring an effective suit to
enforce their rights. An individual may also not have the resources
to litigate, as the process of bringing suit to court is time-consuming,
expensive, and stressful.178 These challenges have led to a lack of
case law pertaining to organ transplantation discrimination on the
basis of cognitive disability. Courts who do hear these cases,
however, should implement clear guidelines for physicians that
allow for discretion but also protect the rights of the disabled.
B. Federally Implemented Amendments to the ASAN
Framework
Congress can also respond to this issue by amending or
supplementing the current federal statutes to provide more guidance
to physicians dealing with organ transplantation. In doing so,
legislators should consider adopting ASAN’s policy framework.179
New Jersey and Maryland have already adopted the ASAN
framework, demonstrating the feasibility of this option.180 While
Congress enacted federal statutes such as Section 504 and Title II to
eliminate discrimination on the basis of disability, these statutes did
not provide sufficient guidance for doctors, regardless of how clear
congressional intent may be. ASAN’s framework can provide
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further guidance that will clarify what physicians may do while
exercising their discretion.
As discussed in Section V.A, it is difficult to raise legal claims
for individuals who have been discriminated against on the basis of
their cognitive disability, even under the protections of Section 504
and Title II.181 Also, while these statutes seek to protect individuals
with disabilities, there is difficulty in enforcing these statutes.182
Healthcare providers, including transplant centers and physicians,
“are already prohibited from discriminating on the basis of disability
on the grounds of both” Section 504 and Title II.183 These statutes,
however, fail to define precisely what constitutes “discrimination”
in the context of organ transplantation.184 Certain proactive
measures, such as ASAN’s policy proposal, can therefore be taken
to combat this uncertainty and provide better protection for the
disabled. Adopting a policy similar to ASAN’s framework would
allow for states to act proactively in regards to passing nondiscrimination legislation for organ transplantation, rather than
acting reactively as seen with California, New Jersey, and
Pennsylvania.185
First, the agencies responsible for oversight of transplant centers
and physicians, such as the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services’ OCR, should require that the head of each transplant
center has a designated responsibility. This person should be
required to hold seminars to fully inform their transplant teams of
the federal civil rights laws and the level of conduct at which they
are obligated to perform. Moreover, this designated physician
should be required to conduct semi-annual employee evaluations
and report the results of those evaluations to OCR at least four times
per year.
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Any legislation passed should also, like California, explicitly
clarify what legal protections are provided against discrimination for
individuals with cognitive disabilities.186 In doing so, legislation
would explicitly prohibit discrimination on the basis of cognitive
disabilities unless a physician can articulate medically relevant
reasons for prohibition on a case-by-case basis.187 The Department
of Health and Human Services should also issue guidance to
physicians in this field to “explicitly clarify[] the applicability of
[Title II] and Section 504 to organ transplantation settings,
indicating examples of acceptable and unacceptable criteria for
evaluation and clarifying that non-medically relevant conditions”
cannot be considered in the decision process.188
Ultimately, a national legislative framework would provide the
most effective means of protecting those with cognitive disabilities
who seek organ transplants. Although self-imposed regulations may
address some instances of discrimination, they would not be a
uniform solution and may not be effectively implemented and
enforced.189 Furthermore, it would be more effective to address this
issue proactively rather than to wait and hope for self-imposed
regulations.190 National standards could also impose external
penalties for non-compliance. These deterring effects can include
required reports to the head of transplant teams or departments in
facilities and mandated annual or bi-annual reports to the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services regarding the reviews
and audits that they have conducted.191 Non-compliance would also
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continue to subject the transplant center decreases in federal
funding.192
In addition to ASAN’s framework, there should be further
guidance as to what constitutes “discrimination.” ASAN does not
take into account rare diseases, like CSS, unfamiliar to research
experts and physicians. In these cases, the determination that the
conditions cause medical complications post-transplant may not be
conclusive. To address this, guidelines should provide further
instructions on what the evaluating physician must do; for example,
the physician could either have to contact specialists globally or
report to a consulting doctor in the facility.193 Until physicians can
find an affirmative contraindication194 between that specific
intellectual disability and the transplant process, they should not be
allowed to preclude the intellectually disabled individual from
eligibility on the transplant waitlist.
Narrower and stricter guidelines supplementing ASAN’s
framework should include a spectrum of risk classification. The
transplant team and evaluating physicians should be given proper
instructions on how to evaluate an individual’s risk for medical
complications post-transplantation by assessing several different
factors. After careful consideration, physicians should place the
individual in one of three categories: Low-Risk, Moderate-Risk, and
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High-Risk.195 A “Low-Risk” individual would be at normal risk
post-transplant operation and they should be proceeded to be placed
on the national transplant waiting list. “Moderate-Risk” individuals
would have some risk of medical complications slightly higher than
normal post-transplant operation. This classification, however,
would not preclude eligibility. In these cases, physicians should be
required to reach out to experts and other researchers to verify
whether or not that particular intellectual disability contraindicates
organ transplantation. “High-Risk” individuals would be those
whose intellectual disability results in a medically confirmed
increased risk of complication. These individuals should be
precluded from being listed as a transplant candidate. Such a system
of classification would protect the rights of those with cognitive
disabilities while preventing those transplants that the medical
community has deemed problematic.
C. Physician Disclosure of Reason for Preclusion
In addition to imposing legislation similar to ASAN’s
framework on organ transplant centers, these transplant centers
should be required to fully inform their physicians and transplant
teams of civil rights laws and guidelines. Furthermore, if physicians
preclude an individual from receiving an organ transplant due to
their cognitive disabilities, they should intelligently and fully
disclose the reasons to the patients. These disclosures should be
given both orally as well as in written form to encourage
compliance. This practice may deter physicians from giving false
evaluations196 rooted in the mentality that providing a transplant to
a disabled patient in effect “wastes” the organ. This requirement
deters such conduct because after a formal denial, if a patient
investigates the denial and uncovers discriminatory practices, he can
pursue litigation. Oral and written disclosures of the reasons for
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transplant denial may provide patients with more tangible evidence
to support their legal claims.
CONCLUSION
There is great disparity in the supply and demand for organs, and
as a result, physicians must inevitably prioritize some transplant
applicants over others. Physicians must balance maximizing the
benefit of scarce organs with maintaining their ethical duty of
creating equal access to transplantation. Whether or not an
individual has an intellectual disability, he or she should be given as
fair a chance at life as any other individual. Physicians should not
hastily deem intellectually disabled individuals as incapable of
surviving post-transplantation operations due to associated medical
complications, given that cognitive disabilities do not necessarily
cause those complications.
Clinical judgment in regards to organ transplantation decisions
entail subjectivity while Section 504 and Title II do not explicitly
address the issue of organ transplantation. As a result, many
transplant physicians presume that Section 504 and Title II are not
applicable to organ transplant eligibility determinations or may not
realize that the term “disability” extends to cognitive disability.197
To counter this, there should be government involvement through
implementation of regulations supplementing Section 504 and Title
II. This supplemental regulation should include specific guidelines
instructing physicians on how to approach situations concerning
individuals with cognitive disabilities and deterring physicians from
proceeding in a discriminatory manner. Though reliance on
physician expertise still remains the focal point of the evaluation,
these guidelines provide needed protection from discrimination for
individuals with cognitive disabilities. These protections will also
allow for the individuals who feel that they have been discriminated
against the proper means to seek court intervention.
Adopting a similar framework to ASAN’s, as well as some
stricter guidelines, would ease the process of candidacy for
allocating and procuring organs for transplant. Maverick, and others
with cognitive disabilities, deserves an opportunity to live and
197
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thrive. He should have the same access to proper resources and his
physicians should be required to conduct extensive research before
refusing access to the transplant waitlist. These proposed guidelines
would afford Maverick’s parents access to concrete evidence to file
suit and a chance at gaining some sort of remedy for their alleged
discrimination. These suggested approaches can create an equitable
platform for individuals with cognitive disabilities for transplant
eligibility.

